openclaw-defender
**Comprehensive security framework for OpenClaw agents against skill supply chain attacks.**
[](https://agentverus.ai/skill/5ca0362b-3397-435b-979a-a3b43e43db5e)Community Comments
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Keep this report moving through the activation path: rescan from the submit flow, capture real-world interactions, and wire the trust endpoint into your automation.
https://agentverus.ai/api/v1/skill/5ca0362b-3397-435b-979a-a3b43e43db5e/trustUse your saved key to act on this report immediately instead of returning to onboarding.
Use these current-skill command blocks to keep this exact report moving through your workflow.
curl -X POST https://agentverus.ai/api/v1/interactions \
-H "Authorization: Bearer at_your_api_key" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"agentPlatform":"openclaw","skillId":"5ca0362b-3397-435b-979a-a3b43e43db5e","interactedAt":"2026-03-15T12:00:00Z","outcome":"success"}'curl https://agentverus.ai/api/v1/skill/5ca0362b-3397-435b-979a-a3b43e43db5e/trustCategory Scores
Findings (21)
The skill contains instructions to download and execute external code, which is a severe supply chain risk.
→ Never download and execute external code. Bundle all required functionality within the skill.
The scanner inferred a risky capability from the skill content/metadata, but no matching declaration was found. Add a declaration with a clear justification, or remove the behavior.
→ Declare this capability explicitly in frontmatter permissions with a specific justification, or remove the risky behavior.
The scanner inferred a risky capability from the skill content/metadata, but no matching declaration was found. Add a declaration with a clear justification, or remove the behavior.
→ Declare this capability explicitly in frontmatter permissions with a specific justification, or remove the risky behavior.
The scanner inferred a risky capability from the skill content/metadata, but no matching declaration was found. Add a declaration with a clear justification, or remove the behavior.
→ Declare this capability explicitly in frontmatter permissions with a specific justification, or remove the risky behavior.
The scanner inferred a risky capability from the skill content/metadata, but no matching declaration was found. Add a declaration with a clear justification, or remove the behavior.
→ Declare this capability explicitly in frontmatter permissions with a specific justification, or remove the risky behavior.
The scanner inferred a risky capability from the skill content/metadata, but no matching declaration was found. Add a declaration with a clear justification, or remove the behavior.
→ Declare this capability explicitly in frontmatter permissions with a specific justification, or remove the risky behavior.
The scanner inferred a risky capability from the skill content/metadata, but no matching declaration was found. Add a declaration with a clear justification, or remove the behavior.
→ Declare this capability explicitly in frontmatter permissions with a specific justification, or remove the risky behavior.
Found direct instruction override pattern: "Ignore previous instructions"
→ Remove all instruction override attempts. Skills must not try to override agent safety behavior.
Base64-encoded string decodes to content containing suspicious keywords.
→ Remove base64-encoded content or replace with plaintext. Obfuscation raises security concerns.
The skill relies on external documentation, specs, or README content as part of its workflow, which introduces an additional remote dependency and trust boundary.
→ Review which external services or providers the skill depends on, what data crosses that boundary, and whether the dependency is necessary for the intended workflow.
Found system modification pattern: "crontab -e"
→ Skills should not modify system configuration or install packages globally. Bundle required dependencies.
Found local file access pattern: "references/"
→ Treat local file browsing as privileged access. Restrict it to explicit user-approved paths and avoid combining it with unrestricted browser/session reuse.
Found local file access pattern: "`runtime-monitor.sh`"
→ Treat local file browsing as privileged access. Restrict it to explicit user-approved paths and avoid combining it with unrestricted browser/session reuse.
Found local file access pattern: "scripts/generate-baseline.sh"
→ Treat local file browsing as privileged access. Restrict it to explicit user-approved paths and avoid combining it with unrestricted browser/session reuse.
Found financial/payment actions pattern: "wallet"
→ Financial actions should always require explicit user confirmation and should be clearly documented.
The skill instructs users to download and execute code from a remote URL, a common supply-chain attack vector.
→ Remove curl-pipe-to-shell patterns. Provide dependencies through safe, verifiable channels.
The skill references 5 external URLs and also discusses auth/API/payment workflows, which increases the chance that sensitive operations depend on many remote endpoints.
→ Minimize external dependencies to reduce supply chain risk.
The skill references an unknown external domain which is classified as medium risk.
→ Verify that this external dependency is trustworthy and necessary.
The skill references an unknown external domain which is classified as low risk.
→ Verify that this external dependency is trustworthy and necessary.
The skill references an unknown external domain which is classified as low risk.
→ Verify that this external dependency is trustworthy and necessary.
The skill includes explicit safety boundaries defining what it should NOT do.
→ Keep these safety boundaries. They improve trust.